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The aim of this article is to ascertain the scope of the exclusive
treaty-making competence of the EEC ("Community").1 With new trade
talks commencing between the United States and the EEC in 19732 and
with the Community determined to proceed beyond the customs union
concept to that of economic and monetary union, 3 it has become in-
creasingly important for American lawyers and statesmen to gain an under-
standing of the authority of the EEC, as an autonomous international legal
entity,4 to conclude agreements and treaties with third countries.
I. Introduction
Articles 113 and 238 of the Treaty of Rome explicitly confer power on
the Community to enter into certain types of treaties and agreements.
*B.A., LL.B (hons.), LL.M.; Centre of European Governmental Studies, Edinburgh,
1970-71; S.J.D. candidate, Univ. of Michigan; Member of State Bar of Texas; Practicing
attorney, Dallas; Lecturer in Law, S.M.U. School of Law, Dallas.
'The terms European Economic Community, EEC and Community will be used in-
terchangeably throughout this article. The EEC was set up in 1958 by the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, signed on March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective
Jan. 1. 1958), cited as Treaty of Rome, with the original signatories being Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As of 1973, three new Members have
acceded to the Treaty of Rome: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The text of the
Treaty of Rome which is used throughout this article is the revised English translation
prepared by the British Foreign Office in 1967.
2 0n March 8, 1972 the Council of the GATT took formal notice of the statements
submitted by the United States and the EEC on the one hand, and the United States and
Japan on the other, in respect of their commitment to conduct a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations under the GATT. See Europe (Agence internationale d'information pour la
presse, Luxembourg, Bruxelles), No. 1002 (n.s.) (March 9, 1972). In these talks it will be
important to ascertain exactly to what extent the EEC is competent to deal with matters on
behalf of the EEC Member States.
3See, From Customs Union to Economic and Monetary Union, 4 BULL. E.E.C. No. 4,
12-15 (1971).
4 0n the international personality of the EEC, see Treaty of Rome, Article 210. For a
commentary see generally W. Feld, The Competence of the European Communities for the
Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEX. L. REV. 891 (1965).
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Article 238 empowers the Community to "conclude with a third country,
with a union of states or with an international organization, agreements
creating an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, joint
action and special procedures." Article 113 provides for the negotiation
and conclusion of "tariff and trade" agreements in the post-transitional
period. The Community may also establish "contacts" with the organs and
specialized agencies of the United Nations, GATT, the Council of Europe,
and OEEC. 5
Article 228 also deals with the treaty-making competence of the Com-
munity, but only inasmuch as it provides a general procedural framework
for the negotiation and conclusion of Community agreements.6 Broadly
speaking, these agreements are to be negotiated by the Commission and
concluded by the Council of Ministers after consultation with the Europe-
an Assembly. Once concluded, the agreements "shall be binding on the
institutions of the Community and on the Member States," Article 228,
however, does not provide any substantive delegation or transfer of
treaty-making power to the Community. 7
Though it appears evident that the Treaty of Rome has called for some
5 Treatv of Rome, Articles 229, 230, 231. Article 229 states that the Commission shall
"ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations" with all international organizations such
as the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and with GATT. Article 230 calls on the
Community to "establish all appropriate forms of co-operation with the Council of Europe;"
and Article 231 calls on the Community to "establish close collaboration" with the O.E.E.C.
Furthermore, the European Commission may on its own initiative establish preliminary
"feelers" with third states without formal Council authorization. However, before official
negotiation takes place, the Commission must secure a "negotiating mandate" from the
Council. For a further consideration see M. Melchior, "La procddure de conclusion des
accords externes de la Communanute conomtique europeenne," [1966] Rev. beige dr. int'l
187. 6Treaty of Rome, Article 228:
I. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community
and one or more States or an international organisation, such agreements shall be negotiated
by the Commission. Subject to the competence conferred upon the Commission in this
respect, such agreements shall be concluded by the Council after the Assembly has been
consulted where required by this Treaty.
"The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain beforehand the opinion of
the Court of Justice as to the extent to which a contemplated agreement is compatible with the
provisions of the Treaty. An agreement which has been the subject of an adverse opinion by
the Court of Justice shall only come into force under the conditions laid down in Article 236.
"2. Agreements concluded in the manner laid down above shall be binding on the in-
stitutions of the Community and on the Member States."
7As commented by G. Testa in "L'intervention des Etats membres dans la procedure de
conclusion des accords d'association de la Communaute economique europdenne," [19661
Cah. dr. ear. 492, 496: "En effet, Particle 228 n'est pas constitutif d'un pouvoir: il entre en jett
settlement an cas on d'autres articles du traite pre'voient la conclusion des accords. II contient
des dispositions a caractere general qui 6tablissent la procedure qu'il faut suivre en principe
pour la formation de tons les accords passes par la Communaute et il en determine les effets.
Le caractbre subsidiaire de cet article resiIne clairement du fait que ces dispositions
s'appliquent sons rAserve des re'gles particulieres enonc es par les article 1/1, 113 et 238
respectivement pour les accords tarifaires, commerciaux et d'association."
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transfer of treaty-making powers to the Community,8 the difficulty in de-
fining the actual scope of this power is both political and legal in com-
postion. Politically, as earlier mentioned, the Member States of the Com-
munity have shown unwillingness to allow the Community to avail itself in
practice of the unprecedented treaty-making powers ostensibly guaranteed
by the Treaty of Rome. 9
Legally, there have not only been great textual difficulties in giving some
accepted and precise meaning to such terms as "association agreement"
under Article 238, "negotiation" and "consultation" under Article 228, and
to the type of trade agreements included under Article 113; there has been
a sharp legal disagreement as to whether or not the exclusive treaty-making
power of the Community does in fact extend beyond certain limited kinds
of tariff and trade agreements.' 0
The problem stems primarily from the fact that the Council, as represen-
tatives of the national interests of the Member States, has frequently found
8See, e.g., P. Pescatore. "Les relations exterieures des Communautes europeennes," op.
cit., 134: "tci, nous sommes en prisence d'un vritable transfert de pouvoirs a' la Comma-
nauti dans le domaine des relations exte'rieures dans la sphire visee' parle traite, c'est
desmorais la Communaute' qui agit en lieu et place des Etats, c'est elle qui engage les ttats,
c'est qui engage les 9tats pas ses engagements."
9See, e.g., Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations conomiques extrieures
sur le.(problemes de la politique commerciale commune a l'issue de la p&iode de transition
prgvue par le traiti CEE, Rapporteur: M. Kriedemann, [1970- 1971] Ear. Parl. Docs., No. 32
(May 12, 1970), cited as Kriedemann Report, at 7: "La fa~on dont le Conseil a ignor6 les
initiatives repetes de la Commission plftot que de les examiner s~rieusement est un indice
supplementaire du fait que les gouvernements des Etats membres se concdent tacitement les
uns aux autres une libert6 de mouvement aussi grande que possibile en matire de politique
commerciale en tant que moyen d'une politique extMrieure souveraine de style classique, autre
manifestation de la tendance a une renationalisation plitot qu'a une idification rgsolue de la
Communautt dans tous les domaines, conforme'ment aux dispositions explicites du trait6."
1Ot may well be helpful at this time to recall the institutional setup of the European
Community. The Treaty of Rome provides generally for the following Community in-
stitutions:
a) The European Assembly, consisting of just over 140 members selected by the various
parliaments of the six Member States. The Assembly, which meets monthly at Strasbourg, has
presently only minimal effective political power in the Community's decision-making process.
Although it possesses a limited competence in the matter of budgetary controls, the main
tasks of the Assembly are the rendering of standing committee reports and the questioning of
members of the European Commission visiting from Brussels. Article 138(3) of the Treaty of
Rome perceives the eventual direct universal election of Assembly members, although appar-
ently this is still a distant vision. In the enlarged Community of 10, there will be some 198
members of the Assembly, with the breakdown by nationality being Italy, France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom 36 members each, Belgium and the Netherlands 14 each, Denmark
and Ireland 10 each, and Luxembourg 6.
b) The Council of Ministers consists of any council of Cabinet ministers from the Member
States, coming together in Brussels primarily to discuss Commission proposals. For the
consideration of the more important matters of Community planning and affairs, the respec-
tive foreign ministers will meet approximately once a month. In principle, the Treaty of Rome
conceived of the Council as the principle decision-making organ in the Community, but in the
daily operation of the Community, the Council often serves more as a Senate, acting on
various proposals submitted by the European Commission.
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itself at odds with the more Community-oriented Commission in its legal
and political views on various issues crucial to the Community. 1 The
picture is not so much "a kind of race between the logic of in-
tergration ... and the logic of diversity,"'1 2 as it is a daily interplay and
dialectic between the multiple levels and strains of divergent and com-
peting political opinions and interests within the Community structure.
II. The Council's Approach -A Restrictive Interpretation
Illustrative of the problems surrounding an assessment of the
treaty-making competence of the Community is the controversy over the
c) The European Commission presently consists of nine members, nationals of the Mem-
ber States, selected for their general competence and independence. Assisted by a staff of
some 5,000 "Eurocrats" centered in the Batiment Berlayment, the Commission is the prime
initiator and formulator of Community actions and policies. In the expanded Community,
there will be 13 members of the Commission, each holding office for 5 years, the President
and Vice-President being appointed for 2 years.
d) The European Court of Justice is composed of seven judges sitting in Luxembourg, and
endeavors to ensure that "the law is observed in the interpretation and implementation" of the
EEC Euratom and E.C.S.C. treaties. The judges are appointed for six-year terms. In the
expanded Community there will be 1 I judges, with an alternative turnover or renewal of
appointments for five judges and two advocate-generals, and six judges and one advo-
cate-general every three years.
With the Treaty Setting up a single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, signed on April 8, 1965, [1967] E.C.J.O. No. 152, at 2 (effective July 1, 1967),
cited as "Merger Treaty," there is now a single set of institutions governing the EEC,
E.C.S.C. and Euratom.
In addition to the above institutions, other Community organs of importance in the deci-
sion-making area are the Committee of Permanent Representatives (composed of representa-
tives of the Member States appointed by the Council to serve as a sort of liason between the
Council and Commission) and various types of management committees. For further reading
on the institutional aspects of the Community see, e.g.: C. Bertram, "Decision-making in the
EEC: The Management Committee Procedure," 5 C.M.L. REV. 246 (1967-68); D. Coombes,
Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: a portrait of the Commission of the
EEC (London, 1970); European Parliament, The First Ten Years 1958-1968 (Strasbourg,
1968); European Parliament. The case for elections to the European Parliament by direct
universal suffrage: Selected Documents (Strasbourg, 1969); P-H, J.M. Houben, Les Conseils
de Ministres des Communaute's europetennes: thorie et realite" 3 Rev. trim. dr. eur. 1
(1967); L. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
(Stanford, 1963); R. MAYNE, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (London,
1968); E. NoiL, THE COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES," 5 J.C.M. STUDIES
219 (1967); L. Scheinman, Some Preliminary notes on bureaucratic relationships in the EEC,
20 INT'L ORG. 750 (1966); E. Stein, The New Institutions, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE (ed. Stein and Nicholson). 33 (Ann Arbor.
1960); STEIN AND HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA (Indianapolis,
1967), 75- 116; and E. WALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(London, 1966).
"See generally, L. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,
op. cit.,; S. HOLT, THE COMMON MARKET: THE CONFLICT OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
(London. 1967); and Lindberg and Schiengold, op. cit., ch. 3.
12S. Hoffman, The Fate of the Nation State, 95 DAEDALUS 862, 881 (1966).
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interpretation of Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome concerning association
agreements. 13 Article 238 provides:
The Community may conclude with a third country, with a union of states or
with an international organization, agreements creating an association in-
volving reciprocal rights and obligations, joint action and special procedures.
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council by unanimous decision
after the Assembly has been consulted.
Where such agreements involve amendments to this Treaty, such amend-
ments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 236.
Article 238: Council's Appraisal
In dealing with Article 238, the Council of Ministers has taken a view
similar to that expressed by one of its former legal advisors, Jean Mrgret.
M6gret tends to dismiss any substantive aspect of Article 238, and to limit
the article to a procedural content similar to that of Article 228.14
In legal terms, the Council of Ministers has come to consider the
concept of association agreements under Article 238, as coextensive with
those types of commercial agreements covered by Articles 111 and 113 of
the Treaty of Rome.15 From the Council's perspective, as will be seen in
its treatment of past association accords, the main distinction between
Articles 238 and 113 is that Article 238 requires such agreements to be
concluded "by the Council acting by unanimous vote and after consulting
the Assembly," while "tariff and trade agreements" under Article 113
require only a qualified majority in the post transitional period and have
never required any consultation with the Assembly.
If the Council's legal analysis of Article 238 is correct, then the imme-
13 For a general consideration of association agreements under the Treaty of Rome see,
inter alia. L. Annaniades, L'association aux Communaut europe'ennes (Paris, 1967); D.
Cohen, The Association of Third Countries with the E.E.C. Pursuant to Article 238, 26 U.
PITT. L. REV. 521 (1964-65); W. Feld, The Association Agreements of the European
Communities, 19 INT'L ORG. 223 (1965); Institut d'eiudes europeennes Universit Libre de
Bruzelles, L'association ? la Communaute economique europe'enne (Brussels, 1970); and J.
Rey, "Champs d'application dans espace. Procedure d'adhe'sion et d'association," in Les
novelles: droit des Communaute's europlenes 647-656 (Brussels, 1968).14See, J. Mggret, "Le pouvior de la CEE de conclure des accords internationaux,"
[1964] Rev. MarchVCommun 529, 533-34. In speaking against a broad interpretation of
Article 238, Megret states: "(C)'est precisement la generalite' et l'imprecision de la com-
petence ainsi de'volue qui rend cette interpretation doutesse. Il est effet difficile d'admettre
que des competences aussi importantes, aussi fondamentales, aussi generales puissent resul-
ter de dispositions aussi vagues, alors que pour le surplus les competences externes de la
Communautuapparaissent si entroitement de'finies et limitees. La difficulte resulte donc de
l'impossibilite de trouver un interpretation e'quilibree et raisonable des termes de I'article
238."
15See J, Costonis, The Treaty-making Power of the European Economic Community:
The Perspectives ofa Decade, 5 C.M.L.REv. 421, 444 (1967-68).
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diate question arises as to why the safeguard provisions under Article 238
are more extensive than those under Article 113. On this matter,
Sciolla-Lagrange has accurately stated:
A wider, and I think more logical, interpretation could consider Article 238
as the basis for the establishment of rights and obligations toward third
countries in all the fields for which the Community has internal competence.
This interpretation is, as I said, more logical since it is very difficult to explain
why the authors of the Treaty should have introduced all the guarantees of
the strict procedure for the conclusion of agreements of association under
Article 238, if these agreements could have only contained provisions on
subjects for which the Community has otherwise, under articles of the
Treaty, and according to a less strict procedure, competence to conclude
agreements. It seems to be unbelievable that the mere word "association"
added to the external agreement of the Community could possibly justify the
adoption of such a strict procedure as the one foreseen by Article 238.16
Moreover, the Council's interpretation of Article 238 appears untenable
on the basis of the legislative history of the article. 17 Though no "travaux
preparatoires" have been published, certain incidents surrounding the
drafting indicate that Article 238 was intended to have a far wider scope,
than that subsequently attributed it by the Council of Ministers. 8 As one
scholar has stressed: there is "ample confirmation that, in the original
conception at least, Article 238 was designed to endow the Community
with a competence that clearly outpaces those of Article 111 and 113."'9
B. Article 238 in Practice: MixedAccord Procedure
To date, nine association agreements have been concluded under Article
238: with Greece in 1963, with Turkey in 1964 with the African States and
Malagassy (Yaounde Accord) in 1964, and 1968, with Nigeria in 1966
(never entered into force), with Tunisia in 1968, with Morocco in 1968,
with Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in 1968 (Arusha Accord), with Malta in
1970, with Maurituis in 1972.20 Save for the association agreements with
16A. Sciolla-Lagrange, "The Preferential Areas Associated with the European Economic
Community," in The Expansion of World Trade: Legal problems and techniques, 4 (BRIT.
INST. OF INT'L & COMP. L., Special Pub. No. 7, 1965).
17For a further consideration of the legislative history of Article 238, see J. Costonis,
"The Association with Nigeria," in L'association 'a la Communaute e'conomique europeenne,
215, 282-92 (Institut d'itudes europiennes Universito Libre de Bruxelles, 1970).
'
8E.g., in the effort of the original six Member States of the EEC to entice the United
Kingdom into some form of ties with the Common Market, M. Spaak (speaking for the Six)
"paid a visit to London in January (of 1957) for talks with the British Ministers, and gave an
undertaking that the Common Market Treaty in its final form would include a specific article
providing for the bilateral or multilateral association of other countries with it." [W. Carter,
Speaking European: the Anglo-Continental cleavage 109 (1966)].9J. Costonis, The Treaty-making Power of the European Economic Community: The
Perspectives of a Decade, op. cit., 447.20See: Accord creantt une association entre la Communaute'economique europienne et
al Grece, signe 9 juillet 196!, [1963] E.G.J.O. 294; Accord creant une association entre la
Communaute elconomique europe'enne et la Turquie, [1964] E.C.J.O. 3687; Convention
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Tunisia, Morocco, Maurituis, and Malta,2 1 these agreements cannot be
seen as "pure" Community accords since each has been concluded under
an arrangement called the "mixed procedure."
The essential rationale behind the use of the "mixed procedure" is that
in those association agreements which the Council considers go beyond the
exclusive treaty-making competence of the Community, the Member
States will be called upon to sign and ratify the agreements in question
along with the Community. Articles 228 and 236 of the Treaty of Rome
call for an amendment of the Treaty in order to give effect to agreements
containing provisions which go beyond the Community's treaty-making
powers.2 2 Therefore, the Council has asserted that the technique of the
"mixed procedure" substantially meets the requirements of Articles 228
and 236 for amending the Treaty and that, accordingly, the "mixed proce-
dure" is consistent with these articles. 2 3
Great difficulties inevitably arise in trying to make some legal sense out
d'association entre la Communaute economique europeenne et les ttats africains et mala-
gache associe's a cette Communaute, [1964] E.C.J.O. 1431 and [1970] E.C.J.O. L 282, at 2;
Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the
Republic of Nigeria (never entered into force), 5. Int'l Leg. Mat. 828 (1966); Accord creant
une association entre la Communaute fconomique europ~enne et le royaume du Maroc, et
documents annexes, [1969] E.C.J.O. L. 197, at 3; Accord cre'ant une association entre la
Communaute economique europeenne et la Republique tunisienne et documents annexes,
[1969] E.C.J.O. L.198, at 3; Accord creant une association entre Ia Communaute econo-
mique europeenne et In repubique unie de Tanzanie, la repubique de L'Ouganda et la
rnpublique du Kenya et documents annexes, [1970] E.C.J.O. L 282, at 55; Accord credant une
association entre la CommunautS economique europienne et Malte, [1971] E.C.J.O. L 61, at
2. Since the time of this writing, Cyprus has concluded an Association Agreement with the
EEC without the intervention of the Member States. This agreement deals solely with matters
of trade.2 1For an interesting and detailed account of the Community's negotiations with Tunisia
and Morocco, see I.W. ZARTMAN, THE POLITICS OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AF-
RICA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: THE WEAK CONFRONT THE STRONG,
116-61 (Princeton, 1971).22Treaty of Rome, Article 236 reads in full:
"The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council
proposals for amendment of this Treaty.
"If the Council, after consulting the Assembly, and if need be, the Commission, expresses
an opinion in favour of the calling of a conference of representatives of the Governments of
Member States, such conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the
purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to this Treaty.
"The amendments shall come into force after being ratified by all Member States in
accordance with their respective constitutional rules."23See, e.g., J. Costonis, The Treaty-making Power of the European Economic Commu-
nity, op. cit. 449, 450: "The supporters of the Council's position concede that Article 228 and
238 require the amendment to the Rome Treaty as a precondition to the effectiveness of an
accord containing provisions that exceed the Community's competence. They recognize,
further, that under the general amendment procedures of Article 236, proposed changes to the
Rome Treaty must be adopted by the member states in accordance with their respective
constitutional rules. But by employing the mixed procedure for the adoption of tainted
Community accords, it is argued, the requirements of Articles 228 and 238 and of Article 236
are met because the Rome Treaty is 'amended' as dictated by the former two articles, and
under procedures that do not differ significantly from those set forth in the three provisions."
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of the "mixed procedure" system. Invariably, this device militates against
the procedure prescribed by the framers of the Treaty of Rome, for dealing
with those instances in which an agreement (or part thereof) may be
incompatable with the Treaty. 24 Article 228 provides for the Council, the
Commission, or a Member State to "obtain beforehand the opinion of the
Court of Justice as to the extent to which a contemplated agreement is
incompatible with the provisions of this Treaty." In cases in which the
Court finds an agreement incompatible, then such agreement can only enter
into force in accordance with the amendment procedure provided for by
Article 236. By use of the "mixed procedure" the Council of Ministers has
bypassed the intended role of the Court of Justice, a violation of the Treaty
of Rome which the Commission has been reluctant to press before the
Court of Justice. Moreover, the Council has in effect perpetrated a scheme
which has systematically been used to restrict to the greatest possible
degree, the delegated treaty-making competence of the Community and to
reserve to the Member States the ultimate power in either accepting or
rejecting association agreements negotiated by the Community. 25
With some words of caution, Pescatore accepts a restricted use of the
"mixed procedure."'26 M~gret finds the procedure to be a special adaptation
of the amendment procedure of Article 236.27 But if in fact, the "mixed
procedure" is to be viewed as a legally acceptable adaptation, the problem
still remains as to which parts of each association agreement concluded
under the "mixed procedure" were considered originally to be inconsistent
with the Treaty of Rome. In the case of the association agreements with
24J. Costonis. "The Association with Nigeria," op. cit., 304: "(i)t is hardly surprising that
the 'law' governing the scope of Article 238 is inarticulate, incoherent, and unpredictable...
Conversely, the mixed procedure short-circuits the mechanisms designed by the framers to
avoid the very difficulties outlined above."
2See, e.g., J. Louis, "Droit et politique des relations extrieures des Communaute's
europ4ennes," [1971] Cah. dr. eur. 3.
26p. Pescatore, "Les relations extSrieures des Communautis europoennes, op. cit.,
104- 106, 106: "Ce proce'd/ nous semble cepedant a certains /gards regrettable, puisqu'il
revient dans leffet pratique 'a vider de leur contenu les attributions de pouvoirs externes aux
Communautes. II faudrait e'viter dans la mesure du possible de meier dans les accords des
matieres pour lesquelles une competence a ete conferee aux Communaute's et des matieres
qui relevant de la competence retenue par les Etats membres. II serait prtferable de scinder
au besoin les matieres et de faire conclure dfus accords paral~les, le premier par la
Communauteet le second par la collectivitd des Etat membres, en liant l'entree en vigeur des
deuz."27J. Mgret, "Le pouvoir de la Communaute' economique europeenne de conclure des
accords internationaux," op. cit., 534-35: "1l est cependant apparu possible de faire
Peconomie de la proce'dure de revision, en admettant que celle-ci, eu gard aux termey de
larticle 238 ut necessaire, en consideration du fait que l'accord serait ratifie' par les Etats
membres dons les memes formes qu'un acte portant rIvision du Traite de Rome et qu'une
telle situation ne pouvait etre depourvre de tout effet a l'egard des eventuels amendments au
TraitS' qu' impliquerait l'accord d'association.... L'interprdtation de larticle 238 reste donc
ouverte et il estpermis depenser qu'elle le restera encore longtemps."
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Greece, Turkey, and the African States and Malagasy, the generally ac-
cepted view throughout the Community was that at a minimum those
sections of the respective agreements which dealt with the granting of
financial aid were beyond the powers of the Community. 28 However, as
Costonis has stated with some irony:
Then came the Nigerian accord which, in contrast to the previous accords,
grants no financial aid, contains no skeletal institutional provisions, shuns
even the suggestion of the creation of an economic union and covers sig-
nificantly less overall trade between the parties. But the Council determined
that this accord, too, exceeded the scope of the Community's competence
under Article 238.29
Article 238: Outer Limits
Where then did the Nigerian accord exceed the limits of the Treaty of
Rome? On this question the Council of Ministers has remained silent.
From a narrow interpretation of Article 238, it would appear that the
Council must have considered only Title I of the Nigerian accord, which
specifically dealt with tariff and trade provisions, to be within the com-
petence of the Community. Titles II and III concerning such matters as
freedom of establishment, of services and of capital movements were
apparently considered to be without the scope of the Community
treaty-making power, even though an internal competence had been pro-
vided for in these areas by the Treaty of Rome.3 0
In the 1962 Birkelbach Report, the European Assembly's Political Com-
mittee made clear that it considered that the concept of association was not
limited to tariff and trade agreements.3 1 Pescatore, in a widely accepted
thesis, has argued that the meaning of association under Article 238 in-
volves some form of basic commitment by the associate state to the
objectives of the Community, acceptance of some broad and long-term
institutional arrangement with the Community, and a working out of recip-
28See, e.g., M. Torelli, "L'association avec la Grece." in L'association la Communaute'
e'conomique europ~enne 23, 36, (Brussels, 1970): "Cette solution (accord mixte) presentait
lavantage de la facilite'... Dans l'accord grec, cette solution 6tait d4fendable compte tenu
des aspects financiers qui, incontestablement, excedaient la compitence communautaire et
l'on comprend parfaitement que certains auteurs aient pu defendre pareill solution."
29J. Costonis, "The Association with Nigeria," op. cit., 298.30See Treaty of Rome, Part Two, Title t11. For a commentary on these articles con-
cerning the freedom of establishment, services and capital movement see e.g., J. M6gret, Le
droit de la Communaute economique europeenne vol. 3, 87-259, (Brussels, 1971).
31See, Rapport fait nom de la commission politique sur les aspects politiques et in-
stitutionnels de I'adhesion ou de I'association a la Communaute" par M. Willi Birkelbach,
[1961-62] Eur, Parl. Docs., No. 122 (Jan. 15, 1962), cited as Birkelbach Report. The
Birkelbach Report makes definite distinctions between the various forms of relationships
which the Community may have with third countries; that is, through adhesion, through
several species of associations, and through tariff and trade agreements."
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rocal trade benefits with the Community.3 2 In the light of the Birkelbach
Report and Pescatores definition, it is hard to conceive where the associ-
ation agreement with Nigeria would exceed the bounds of Article 238.33
Another illustrative example can be found in the Association Agreement
of September 24, 1969 with Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya.3 4 This agree-
ment was a renewal of the earlier "Arusha Agreement" which, although
signed on July 6, 1968, never came into force, because the ratification
procedures were still being carried out in the Member States of the Com-
munity at the expiration date of May 31, 1969.3 5 Like the association
agreement with Nigeria, the agreement with Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya
deals primarily with trade, freedom of establishment and services, transfer
of foreign currency payments relating to trade in goods and services and of
capital movements in matters of investments, and loose institutional provi-
sions. From an examination of the agreement there does not appear to be
any area covered which the Community does not have the internal com-
petence to deal with.36 The Council of Ministers, however, again insisted
upon the use of the "mixed procedure."
32p. Pescatore, "Les relations ext/rieures des Communauts europe'ennes," op. cit.,
104- 106. See also, J. Rey, "Champs d'application dans I'space. Proc/dare d'adhision et
d'association," op. cit., 654-56.
33See generally, Rapport presente au nom de la Commission pour la cooperation avec des
pays en voie de development sur laccord creant tne association entre la Communaute'
'conomique europeenne et la republique du Nigeria et les documents annexes (doc. 113),
Rapporteur: M. Gerolamo Lino Moro, [1966-671 Ear. Parl. Docs., No. 134, cited as Moro
Report. See in particular, Annex IlI of the Moro Report on "A vis de la commission politique
sur les aspects institutionnels et politiques de laccord cre'ant une association entre la C.E.E.
at la republique du Nigeria, R/dacteur: M. F. Dehousse."
34For a consideration of this accord see, Rapport fait au nor de la commission des
relations africains et malagache sur laccord d'association entre /a C.E.E. et la republique
unie Tanzanie, la rpublique de I'Ouganda et la republique du Kenya, Rapporteur: M.
Bersani, [1969-70] Ear. Parl. Docs. No. 175, cited as Bersani Report. See also, H.
Schmidt-Ohlendorf, "L'association avec les Etats de l'afrique de I'Est," in L'association a la
Communaute'economique europeenne 319, (Brussels, 1970).
35 1t is perhaps interesting in this context to recall one of the arguments put forward for
the use of the "mixed procedure" at the time of the Greek and Turkish Accords: the use of
the procedure would be more expedient in amending the Treaty of Rome than would the
formal process provided for under Article 236. It would appear, however, that the "mixed
procedure" has never shown itself to be exceptionally expedient. Significant delays were
entailed between the time of signature and ratification in the Greek and Turkish Accords; and
the Nigerian Accord was never finally ratified, though internal complications in Nigeria at the
time did add significantly to the problem.
36See Bersani Report, op. cit., 5:
"(T)he European Assembly considers that it would be advisable to forego, in this case,
the rather complex ratification formalities required in the six Member States. As far as
the European partners are concerned, the Accord could have been concluded on the sole
basis of the procedure laid down in Article 236 .... Unlike the Yaounde Convention,
which calls for direct commitments-of a financial nature in particular-on the part of the
EEC Member States, the Arusha Agreement covers matters which come exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Community. Neither can it be said that the intervention of
the Member States was required in view of the special political importance of the text
since, in this respect all matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Community are of
similar importance."
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D. Assessment
The association agreements with Nigeria and with Tanzania, Uganda
and Kenya give the indication of the development of a broad principle, that
all association agreements which go beyond the scope of Article 113 (as
determined by the Council of Ministers) are to be concluded jointly by the
Community and the Member States. In political terms, this development
lends a certain practical credence to Testa's suggestion that the use of the
"mixed procedure" is simply a cloak for the reality that at the present time
the Community is devoid of the capacity to bind the Member States in
such international agreements. 37
Admittedly, the association agreements with Tunisia, Morocco and Mal-
ta were signed only by the Council of Ministers of the European Commu-
nity, and not by the Member States.3 8 However, it must be noted that the
contents of each of these three agreements (save for institutional arrange-
ments) deal exclusively with matters of tariff and trade, that is, falling
within the scope of Article 113. In effect, it does not appear that the
Council will of its own initiative permit a "pure" Community agreement,
unless it is within the bounds of Article 113: and even here (as will
subsequently be seen), the Council has on several occasions employed the
"mixed procedure" for agreements concluded under both Article 1 11 and
1 .39
This dispute over the use of the "mixed procedure" may appear to be
more academic in nature, than practical. Article 238 explicitly leaves the
ultimate power of concluding the association agreements with the Council
of Ministers. As the Council is the effective representative of the interests
of the Member States, the distinction between the Council signing the
agreement alone and signing it concurrently with the Member States seems
greatly exaggerated.
However, the "mixed procedure system" (as opposed to an agreement
3 7G. Testa, "L'intervention des Etats membres dans la procedure de conclusion des
aycords d'association de la Communaute economique europfenne,'" op. cit., 5 12- 13: "Les
Etats membres-M. Pescatore lui-meme le reconnait-ont repris par le truchement des accordsS/
externes certains droits que l'on pouvait croire integres au sein des Communautes. Ce sont
donc Etats membres qui ant pris les engagements internationaux, tandis que la Communaute'
a montr6 son incapacite' a ce sujet. Ce fait temoigne de ce que la Communaut malgre les
efforts de la Commission, ne posse'de pas encore 'autonomie et le pouvoir d'assumer seule
des engagements internationaux. Elle n'a pas encore cette capacitlqui est le signe certain de
la possession de la personaliteljuridique internationale."
38 For a consideration of these agreements, see, e.g., Rapport fait au nom de la commis-
sion politique sur l'accord crant une association entre ta Communaute' econormque eu-
ropeIene et Malte, Rapporteur: M. R. Cantalupo, [1970-71] Eur. Parl. Docs., No. 257;
"L'association de Malte avec la C.E.E.", [1971] Rev. Marche' Commun 181; A. Dubois,
"L'association de la Tunisie et du Maroc a la Communaute' [1969] Rev. Marchd Commun
355. 39E.g., the Dillon and Kennedy Round tariff agreements, and the Agreement on Trade
and Technical Assistance with Lebanon.
International Lawyer. Vol. 7. No. 3
600 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
concluded solely by the Community) contemplates an agreement mutually
concluded by the Member States and the Community. In practice, the
"mixed procedure system" requires that the agreement first be subjected to
the respective constitutional rules of ratification in each of the Member
States (i.e., the approval of the various national parliaments must be
gained). Thereafter (and only thereafter), the Council of Ministers on
behalf of the Community will adopt a decision approving the agreement. 40
In a "pure" Community agreement, this requirement. of parallel national
ratification is by-passed: the agreement is approved solely by the Commu-
nity, but is nevertheless binding on both the Community and the individual
Member States. In effect, the "pure" agreement procedure connotes that
the European Community as a distinct international entity possesses the
autonomous competence to conclude international accords of such scope,
within the meaning of the Treaty of Rome. Beyond the area of tariff and
trade matters, however, the Council has been wholly reluctant to extend
the treaty-making powers of the Community. 41
Moreover, the Council of Ministers has further attempted to restrict the
delegated negotiating powers of the Commission and the right of con-
sultation of the European Assembly, in the treaty-making process outlined
by the Treaty of Rome. Briefly, the treaty-making process in theory con-
sists of the Council issuing an official negotiating mandate or directive to
the Commission, to open formal talks accompanied by written instructions
outlining in detail the objectives of the negotiation, the advantages to be
sought, and the concessions to be granted. The Commission is bound by
the terms of the mandate, but within these terms the Commission is to
function independently in negotiating the association agreement.42 The
Council of Ministers, however, continually insisted upon some form of
concurrent control in the negotiating phase of the association agreements. 4a
40For a consideration of the various national rules of ratification in the Member States of
the EEC, see STEIN AND HAY, op. cit., Ch. 1.4 1See, e.g., J. Costonis, "The Association with Nigeria," op. cit., 310: "The con-
sequences of the political resistance of the member states to any erosion of their foreign
relations prerogatives appears with equal clarity in our study of the treaty-making practices in
the Community. Enough has been said about the structure of the practices to demonstrate the
predominant role of this factor in their evolution. Critical powers of control have been vested
in the Council and the member states with little reference to the apparent requirements of the
Rome Treaty. Conversely, the Commission which has been permitted to play an immensely
creative role in so many phases of the treaty-making process, has nevertheless found itself
isolated in the Council on issues dealing with the formal allocation of competences between
the Community and the member states."42For further discussion see M. Melchior, "La procedure de conclusion des accords
externes de la Communaute' economique europeenne," op. cit.
43See generally B. Bot, Negotiating Community Agreements: Procedure and Practice, 7
C.M.L. REV. 286 (1970).
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The Council has seen fit to insist upon the same degree of control in the
negotiating stage of association agreements, as it has in the negotiation of
tariff agreements under Article I 11, and of tariff and trade agreements in
the post transitional stage under Article 113. On this point, Article 113(3)
states in part:
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a
special Committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this
task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may give to
it.
In the case of association accords, the Council has repeatedly and
successfully insisted upon the presence of "national observers" in the
negotiating stage of association agreements. Although these observers do
not have actual power to negotiate, their presence is designed to ensure
that the Commission stays within the terms of the negotiating mandate.
Further, in the negotiation of the second association agreement with the
African States and Malagasy, the Council asserted for itself the primary
role in the actual negotiation of this agreement. 44 The Commission's com-
plaint that it alone has the power to negotiate association agreements went
unheeded. 45
Certain commentators find that the exercise of this concurrent control in
the negotiating stage of association agreements makes good political sense.
They seem to feel that the "only guarantee for a balanced result would
therefore seem to lie in a close interplay between Commission and Coun-
cil." '4 6 However, regardless of the soundness of this political reasoning, one
inescapable effect of the matter has been that the Member States of the
Community, as represented in the Council of Ministers, have been very
tenacious in maintaining as much power as possible in all stages of the
treaty-making process in which the Community may be involved. This
reality has been but further attested to by the running battle which the
44See Europe No. 233 (new series), Dec. 12, 1968., at 8.
4For the Commission's position on the negotiation of the Second Yaounde Convention,
see Europe No. 250 (new series), Jan. 13, 1969, at 5.4 6B. Bot, Negotiating Community Agreements, op. cit., 295. Concerning the devel-
opment of the Council's exercise of control during the negotiating process, Bot writes: "A
notable change, as far as negotiations of association agreements are concerned, occurred in
the wake of negotiations with Greece. Till then, a group of observers had not been present at
the negotiations proper. In view of the rather broad interpretation given by the Commission to
its mandate, the Council wished to secure better safeguards in order to obtain a more
scrupulous execution of its instructions. It was decided that national observers should be
present during association-agreement negotiations .... The presence of national observers
meanwhile, during Article-238 negotiations, constitutes more than a token representation,
although less than an active intervention. The Commission frequently consults the observers
during the negotiations as to the possibility of making minor adaptations to the mandate." Id.,
294.
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European Assembly has had with the Council in trying to secure effective
consultation rights in matters of association accords covered by Article
238. 47
III The Commission and the
Court of Justice- A Broader View
Against this restrictive view of the general treaty-making competence of
the Community held by the Council of Ministers stands the view espoused
by the European Commission and supported by the Court of Justice. This
view postulates that the Community possesses the same degree of com-
petence to deal with external affairs as it possesses in internal matters. A
graphic illustration of this so-called theory of "parallelism" can be seen in
the first case ever instituted by the Commission against the Council of
Ministers (Commission v. Council), brought before the European Court of
Justice in May 1970.48
47See generally, Rapport fait au nom de la commission politique sur les competences et
les pouvoirs du Parlement europten, Rapporteur: M. Hans Furler, [1963-64] Eur. Parl.
Docs. No. 3 1, cited as Furler Report. The center of the controversy revolves around the
interpretation of when the Assembly should be consulted, prior or subsequent to signature. As
commented by J. M6gret in "Le pouvoir de la Communaute economique europeenne de
conclure des accords internationaux," op. cit., 24: "En re'aliteI ce debat montre clairement
l'existence d'un problme: ce n'est pas celui dont il vient d'etre parle: c'est celui des pouvoirs
de IA ssemblee. Le probleme qui preoccupe bien legitimement IA ssemblee est celui du poids
reel de son avis dans la procedure selon laquelle un accord international est eabore. De ce
point de vue technique il n'est pas douteux que la veritable solution serait de donner a
I'Assemblee le pouvoir d'approuver les accords d'association. Cette question est donc lie au
probleme gene/ral du renforcement des pouviors de I'Assemblee, problhme qui retient depuis
tn certain temps deja l'attention du Conseil." For a graphic illustration of the controversy
see, Rapport presente au nom de la commission temporaire spe'ciale pour l'association de la
Grece a la Communaute economique europeenne sur la procedure adoptee pour la con-
clusion de laccord d'association 1 la Communaute economique europeenne, Rapporteur: M.
E. Battista, [1961-62] Eur. Parl. Docs., Doc. 61 (Note in particular Annexes 11 and 111 which
contain an exchange of letters from the Council of Ministers to the Assembly.) After the
conclusion of the association agreement with Turkey, the Council agreed to follow what has
come to be called the "Luns Procedure": that is, the Assembly is to be informed of the
content of association agreements before they are signed, and formal consultation with the
Assembly laid down in Article 238 takes place after signature. This procedure was first used
in the Nigeria Accord; but M. Dehousse noted in the Moro Report, op. cit. 22: "Cette
proc/dure laisse cependant 'a desirer, ne serait-ce que parce que L'echange de vues avec le
representant du Conseil n'intervenient que peu temps avant signature de l'accord. Dans ces
conditions, il n'est pratiquement plus possible d'obtenir que le contenu de l'accord soit
modifii, ni a fortiori, que sa conclusion soit remise en question, ce qui rend inefficace la
consultation du Parlement prescrite par 'art. 238 du traitS instituant la C.E.E." See also,
Bersani Report, op. cit. The "Luns Procedure" was used in the last Community association
agreement (with Malta).48Court of Justice of the European Communities, Commission des Communautes eu-
ropeennes contre Conseil des Communautes europe'ennes (Arr~t 22/70), March 31, 1971,
cited as Commission v. Council. Any English translations used in connection with this case
are in conformity with the translation supplied through the services of the European Commu-
nities. For a consideration of the Commission's approach see also R. Dupuy, "Du caractbre
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A. Commission v. Council-Facts
As mentioned earlier, one of the three essential policies to be instituted
on a Community level as a part of the Common Market, was "the adoption
of a common policy in the sphere of transport." To this end, Title IV of the
Treaty of Rome specifically treats common Community transport policy.4 9
Pursuant to one of the provisions in Title IV (Article 75) and upon an
earlier Commission proposal as to the working hours of lorry drivers, the
Council of Ministers adopted a regulation providing for a maximum contin-
uous driving period of four hours with respect to transportation of passen-
gers and goods, a maximum daily driving period of eight hours, and a
maximum weekly driving period of forty-eight hours. This Regulation,
543/69/EEC, became applicable to intra-Community traffic on October 1,
1969; however, the effective date regarding traffic between the Community
and non-member states was postponed until October 1, 1970.50
This postponement was necessitated by the desire of the Community to
reconcile its regulation with the work being carried on by the Transport
Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe (one of the regional
Commissions of the United Nations), in the area of safe road times for
lorry drivers. The Transport Committee had previously prepared a Europe-
an Agreement on International Road Transport Workers (ERTA) in 1962,
which called for a maximum daily driving time of nine hours and a max-
imum continuous driving time of five hours.5 1 Although the ERTA was
never ratified, in 1970 it was agreed among the non-Community partici-
pants in the 1962 ERTA negotiation, that an agreement should be signed
which would establish a maximum daily driving time of nine hours, this
period to be reduced to eight hours at the beginning of 1974.52
At the conclusion of its session of March 20-21, 1970, the Council of
Ministers issued a communiqu6 approving "a mandate to allow the Mem-
ber States to continue negotiations for the conclusion" of the ERTA,
unitaire de la Communautd oconomique europl4enne dans ses relations exterieures," 9
A.F.D.I. 779, 804-09; and L. Ananiades, L'association aux Communautels europeennes, OP.
cit., 121-23.49 Treaty of Rome, Articles 74-84. For a consideration of the Community's common
transport policy, see N. Despicht, The Transport Policy of the European Communities
(London, 1969); and M. Sohier, "Apercu du developpement actuel de la politique commun
des transports," [1970] Cah. dr. eur. 154.5 0See Council of Ministers (EC), Reglement No. 543/69/CEE, du 25 mars 1969, relatif a
l'harmonisation de certaines dispositions en matiere sociale dans le domaine des transports
par route, [1969] E.C.J.O. L. 77, at 49, cited as Regulation 543/69/EEC. As for the
postponement date concerning traffic between the Community and non-member states, see
Article 2 and 19(2) of Regulation 543/69/EEC.
5 1See Economic Commission for Europe, European Agreement concerning the Work of
Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport, Geneva, Jan. 19, 1962, U.N.
Doc. E/ECE/457 (1962), cited us "ERTA." See in particular, Article 7 of the ERTA.5 2See [1970] Bull. E.C. No. 3, at 67.
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although "(i)t was understood that this decision did not prejudice the
general question of procedures for the conclusion of international agree-
ments regarding transport.- 53
By virtue of a subsequent compromise worked out by the Committee of
Permanent Representatives of the Council, an updated ERTA was com-
pleted at the April, 1970 conference of the Economic Commission for
Europe's Transport Committee and the agreement itself was opened for
signature on July 1, 1970. The compromise was that the Community's
earlier regulation on driving hours would be adjusted prior to signature of
the agreement by the Member States, in order to bring it into alignment
with the revised ERTA. 54
The European Commission, while favoring the objectives of the new
ERTA, strenuously objected to the negotiation of the new accord by the
Member States of the Community. The Commissions insisted that the
procedure set out by Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome was controlling
here, and that the Commission should be the sole representative of the
Community at the negotiations. On May 19, 1970, the Commission filed an
application with the European Court of Justice seeking an annulment of the
Council's "discussion" on March 20th regarding the negotiation and con-
clusion of the ERTA by the Member States of the Community.
B. The Basis of the Commission's Argument
After asserting that the Council's "discussion" of March 20th was a
reviewable act within the meaning of Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome, 55
the Commission contended that under the broad scope of Article 75(1)
concerning the implementation of the common transport policy, the Com-
munity possessed the exclusive competence to conclude agreements such
as the ERTA. Article 75(1) was seen to apply to the same extent to
matters of external relations as it would to internal measures in the sphere
of transport policy.
Article 75(1) provides in part that the "Council shall ... lay down [not
only] common rules applicable to international transport from or to the
territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more
53[1970] Bull. E.C. No. 5, at 67.54See [197 1] Bull. E.C. No. 2, at 7 1.55See, Commission v. Council, 7- 10. The Commission rejected the Council's contention
that the "discussion" in question had no legal effect and therefore was not a reviewable act
under Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome. Finding this assertion by the Council to be more
contrived than factual, the Commission stressed that the Council's position in regard to the
ERTA negotiations did in fact determine the position taken by the Member States of the
Community in those negotiations. Accordingly, the "discussion" in question was a Commu-
nity act having legal consequences and there was therefore a reviewable act within the
meaning of Article 173.
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Member States ... [but also] any other appropriate provisions." The Com-
mission asserted that the phrase "any other appropriate provisions" em-
braced the matters of external transport agreements: and that although this
competence may not originally have covered the entire realm of transport
policy, it would gradually expand and eventually become exclusive as the
common transport policy came into being. 56
What the Commission was putting forward was a theory of "paral-
lelism;" that is, once the Community adopted a measure in a given area,
even if this act had solely intra-Community implications, the Member
States were precluded from dealing with matters of the same kind in-
ternally. The Member States were to retain their previous powers, up until
the time the Community acted. But once the Community acted in a particu-
lar area internally, then the Member States lost even concurrent power to
act in this area.
The Commission felt that this notion of "preemption" would insure that
the Member States could not conclude international agreements which
would be in conflict with internal Community measures, but would guaran-
tee that internal and external measures in the same sphere would not
receive multiple interpretations by the European Court of Justice and by
the national courts. 57 In its arguments, the Commission also denied that the
Council had any discretion in determining whether concurrent powers
should exist in certain cases. 58
C. Council's Reply
After a vigorous challenge of the admissibility of the complaint,5 9 the
Council countered that the Community's external powers could not be
assumed in the absence of an express provision of the Treaty of Rome.
The Council argued that Article 75(1) did not confer any such express
powers on the Community. Further, the Council stressed that although the
common transport policy may imply certain international aspects, this was
561d., 13: "A insi, au fur et h mesure qu 'entrerajent en vigeur des regles communautaires,
la competence de la Communaute' sur la matie're regie par ces regles deviendrait, progressive-
ment, exclusive."57Ibid., 13- 14.581d., 12: "Les principes valables pour L'action autonome de la Communaute'
s'appliqueraient aux accords conclure avec les pays tiers, lorsque ceux-ci ont une incidence
immidiate et directe sur ly contenu ou la portee des dispositions communautaires en vigenur
sur le plan interne. Les Etats membres ne conserveraient leurs competences qu'aussi long-
temps que la Communaut6 n'a pas exercel la sienne, c'est-a-dire par effectivement arrete des
dispositions communes. En revanche, lorsque etdans la mesure oui la Communaute' a
effectivement etabli de telles relglementations, les Etats membres auraient perdu toute com-
petence pour I Vifere au meme niveau et ne seraient plus appeles a intervenir que pour
prendre, le cas echeant, les mesures necessaires a rexecution du reglement communautaire."59See Ibid., 5-7.
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not sufficient in itself to necessitate the "preemption" of Member States
from promulgating national measures in the area of transport. The Council
contended that Article 75(1) dealt solely with intra-Community matters.6 0
Even conceding, arguendo, that Article 75(1) has conferred
treaty-making powers on the Community, the Council insisted that this
grant of authority could not be viewed as general and exclusive, but at
most would be concurrent with the powers of the Member States. It would
be for the Council in each case to decide whether the matter in question
should be dealt with by international agreement, and whether or not the
agreement should be concluded by the Member States or the Community
(or by both). 61
D. Opinion of the Advocate-General
In his submissions to the Court, the advocate-general, M. Dutheillet de
Lamothe, stated that absent an explicit grant of treaty-making authority in
the transport section of the Treaty of Rome, such authority could only find
its legal basis in other specific provisions of the Treaty which could be
applied to matters concerning transport (e.g., Article 116), or from general
provisions of the Treaty which could be interpreted in such a way as to
confer external authority on the Community in the sphere of transport
(e.g., Articles 228 AND 235).62
The advocate-general dismissed Article 116 as a possible basis, because
having been included in Chapter 111, which concerned commercial policy,
it could not be read as a general provision of the Treaty which could be
applied to the transport sector. However, considering Article 228 in con-
nection with Article 75(1), he conceded that this article could be asserted
as a basis for conferring an "implied power" on the Community to nego-
tiate and conclude accords similar to the ERTA. Yet, however desirable
60Ibid., 14- 15: "La competence de la Communaute' ' poser des actes juridiques serait
limit~e de piano a des mesures automones, sauf si des dispositions non ambigue's, comme les
articles 111, 113 et 238, lui ont attribu une competence pour ta conclusion d'accords
internationaux.... (L)a circonstance que le domaine des transports presente des aspects
internationaux ne serait constituer un argument a l'encontre de sa reglementation par des
dispositions nationales ou communautaires autonomes."
611d., 15: "Meme s'il tait admis que 'article 75, paragraph ler, alinea c) peat fonder
une competence de la Communaute" a conclure des accords internationaux, cette competence
ne saurait etre g nlrale et exclusive, mais tout au plus concurrente. II serait donc in-
dispensable que, dans chaque cas, le Conseil determine s'il est utile ou non que la matiere soit
reglementle par des dispositions autonomes ou conventionnelles et, dans ce dernier cas, si
l'accord international est utilement conclu par la Communaute o'u par les Etats membres."62Article 166 of the Treaty of Rome states that the role of the advocate-general is "to
make reasoned submissions in open Court, with complete impartiality and independence, on
cases submitted to the Court of Justice, with a view to assisting the Court in the performance
of the duty assigned to it .. " For a further consideration of the role of importance of the
advocate-general, see D. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Communities vol.
1, at 30-35 (London, 1965).
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this approach may seem from the viewpoint of a "Community ethic," the
advocate-general could find no legal basis for this approach in the Treaty
itself.
For purely practical reasons, he felt it would be extremely difficult to
develop workable criteria for determining which regulations involved a
transfer of external authority to the Community, and which would not
entail a "preemption" of the authority of the Member States. The advo-
cate-general also speculated that the doctrine of "preemption" might fur-
ther complicate the legislative process of the Community, by making the
Council of Ministers more hesitant to act in those areas which would tend
to limit the freedom of action of a Member State in its external relations. 63
As to the argument based on Article 235, the advocate-general con-
tended that the Commission's interpretation of this article, as granting the
Community exclusive power to act in those matters of the transport area
which had international implications was unfounded. Article 235 states:
Where action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the course
of operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community,
and where this Treaty has not provided for the necessary powers of action,
the Council shall, by unanimous decision, on a proposal from the Commission
and after the Assembly has been consulted, take the appropriate steps.
Stressing the distinction between the American concept of "implied
powers" and the European notion of "competences d'attribution," the
advocate-general concluded that Article 235 places no obligation on the
Council to act, and that this article must receive a strict interpretation. 64
The advocate-general argued that in any event the act of the Council in
question was not a reviewable act within the meaning of Article 173 of the
Treaty of Rome, and therefore appeal by the Commission could not be
made under this article.6 5
E. Judgment of the Court
Before considering the question of the admissibility of the Commission's
application, the Court of Justice found it necessary first to ascertain wheth-
er or not, at the time of the "discussion" by the Council of Ministers on
March 20, 1970, the Community actually possessed the competence to
negotiate and conclude the ERTA. This aspect of the judgment is perhaps
the most relevant to the present study.
63Commission v. Council (Conclusions de l'avocat-general), 16-23.
e
41d., 25-26, 26: "'Reconnattre des "implied powers" ' la Communaute' en matire de
negociations avec des pays tiefs, ne serait-ce pas aller beaucoup plus loin que ce qu'ont voulu
les auteurs du traite et les Etats qui l'ont signe et accepte? ... Pour notre part, nous le
pensons et c'est la principale raison qui nous conduit a vous proposer en ce domaine une
interpretation relativement stricte du traite'
651d., 5- 13.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
608 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Finding no specific provisions of the Treaty of Rome concerning in-
ternational agreements in the sphere of transport policy, the Court of
Justice turned to a consideration of the general system of Community law
relating to agreements with non-Member States. In interpreting Article
210, which states that the "Community shall have legal personality," the
Court noted the following:
This provision, placed at the head of Part Six of the Treaty, devoted to
General and Final Provisions, means that in its external relations the Com-
munity enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with non-Member
States over the whole extent of the field of objectives defined in Part One of
the Treaty. (emphasis added)66
In considering further this general treaty-making power of the Commu-
nity, the Court went on to state:
To determine in a particular case the Community's authority to enter into
international agreements, one must have regard to the whole scheme of the
Treaty no less than to its specific provisions. Such authority may arise not
only from an explicit grant by the Treaty-as is the case with Article 113 and
114 for tariff and trade agreements and with Article 238 for association
agreements-but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and
from steps taken, within the framework of these provisions, by the Commu-
nity institutions. In particular, each time the Community, with a view to
implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, lays down common
rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the
right, acting individually or even collectively, to contract obligations toward
non-Member States affecting these rules. To the extent that such common
rules come into being, the Community alone is in a position to assume and
carry out contractual obligations toward non-Member States, affecting the
whole sphere of application of the Community legal system. One cannot,
therefore, in implementing the provisions of the Treaty, separate the category
of measures internal to the Community from that of external relations ... (I)t
follows that to the extent that Community rules are promulgated for the
attainment of the purposes of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside
the framework of Community institutions, assume obligations likely to affect
such rules or alter their scope.(emphasis added)6 7
Finding that the ERTA had the same field of application as Council
Regulation 543/69 concerning truckers' hours, the Court declared that
"authority to negotiate and conclude this Agreement belongs, since the
regulation came into force, to the Community." s6 8 The Court rejected the
possibility of concurrent authority on the part of the Member States of the
Community, since any exercise of such authority outside the common
framework of Community institutions, would be inconsistent with the unity
66Commission v. Council (Arr&t de ]a Cour), 20.
671bid., 20-21.
68Ibid., 22.
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of the Common Market and with the uniform application of Community
law.69
As to the question of admissibility of the Commission's application, the
Court held the "discussion" on March 20th was to be a reviewable act
within the meaning of Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome. 70 However,
when the Court of Justice came to the merits of the case, it ruled in favor
of the Council.
In rejecting the Commission's contention that the Council by its "dis-
cussion" had infringed Articles 75, 228 and 235 with regard to the dis-
tribution of powers between the Council and Commission in the negotia-
tion of the ERTA, the Court of Justice noted that the ERTA did not
constitute a new agreement as such, but was merely a revision of the
earlier 1962 Agreement. In this light, the Court contended that the origins
of the ERTA and a considerable amount of the work carried out on it had
in fact taken place prior to the grant of authority to the Community by
Regulation 543/69.
Accordingly, the Court of Justice found that the Council had entered its
"discussion" (on March 20, 1970) at a stage "where it no longer enjoyed
complete freedom of action in its relationships with the non-Member States
taking part in the same negotiations."171 As the Commission had made no
formal use of its right of submitting proposals to the Council under Articles
75 and 116, nor had initially requested a straightforward application of the
negotiation scheme under Article 228, the Court decided that in these
circumstances the Council had not defaulted in its obligations arising from
the Treaty of Rome.
F. Critique
To certain writers there appears to be a marked inconsistency between
the Court's theoretical reasoning as to the general treaty-making com-
petence of the Community and the actual decision handed down. 72 How-
ever, the crucial point to remember is the effect a ruling in favor of the
691bid., 23: '(C)ette competence communautaire exclut la possibilit6 d'une competence
concurrente des Etats membres, toute initiative prise hors du cadre des institutions communes
etant incompatible avec l'unite du marcheicommun et l'application uniforme du droit commu-
nautaire."70Ibid., 23-26: Essentially the Court took a liberal view of Article 173 of the Treaty of
Rome, by stating that all Community acts (and not simply those categories encompassed by
Article 189 of the Treaty, that is, regulations, directives and decisions) intended to have a
legal effect were reviewable under Article 173.71Ibid., 31.72See, e.g., D. Collinson, The Foreign Relations Powers of the European Communities:
A Comment on "Commission v. Council," 23 STAN. L. REV. 956 (1971), 971-72.
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Community would have had on the ERTA. On this the Court of Justice
realistically stated:
(T)o have suggested to the non-Member States concerned that there was now
a new distribution of powers within the Community might well have jeopard-
ized the successful outcome of the negotiations, as indeed was recognized by
the Commission's representative in course of the Council's discussion. 73
The Court of Justice wisely chose to unravel a broad legal principle
concerning the Community's competence in external relations while still
upholding the ERTA. While the Court's reasoning in places may have been
tortuous, the effect of the decision must be seen as sound with regard to
this particular case. 7
4
Difficulties will undoubtedly arise, however, when this broad legal prin-
ciple of "parallelism" is applied to the various functional areas of Commu-
nity activity. The Court's embrace of the theory of "parallelism" is in fact
overly simplistic, and does not meet the technical problems posed by the
broad extension of such a theory. 75 Is there really to be a strict parallelism
("foro interno, foro externo"), or will the Community have only exclusive
external competence where it is essentially necessary to preserve the
common rules of the Community. Again, what actually are these "common
rules?" Would they cover Community recommendations, opinions, dis-
cussions (as it appeared to do with the ERTA)? These points of definition,
along with many more, will need to be resolved by the Court in the future.
IV. Concluding Observations
The nature and scope of the Community's exclusive treaty-making com-
petence is essentially a constitutional problem relating to the distribution of
powers between the Community and the Member States. From an exam-
ination of both Article 238 and 113 of the Treaty of Rome, it appears that
the Council of Ministers' attempts to delimit the content of these articles
have no legal basis. Further, with the recent decision of Commission v.
Council, it seems clear that the constitutional dictate of the Treaty of
Rome is that the Community is to have that degree of exclusive external
competence which parallels its internal competence.
Although the distinction between holding and dictum does not pertain to
73Commission v. Council (A rr~t de la Cour), 3 1.74 For further commentary on Commission v. Council see note on the case by LJ.
Constantinescu in (1971) Rev. trim. dr. eur. 796; J.V. Louis, "Cour de Justice, 31 mars
1971," (1971) Cah. dr. eur. 468; and note by J. Winter, 7 C.M.L. REv. 392 (1971). For a
highly critical evaluation of the decision see "L'arret du 31 mars 1971," (1971) Rev. Marche'
Commun 211.75See generally, Ganshof van der Meersch, "Les relations exterieures de la CEE dans le
domaine des politiques communes et 'arret de la Cour de Justice du 31 mars 1971," (1971)
Cah. dr. eur. 127.
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the judgments of the Court of Justice, as it does to the judgments of
common law courts (as "stare decisis" is not applicable), 76 it is important
not to dismiss what the Court had to say about the general treaty-making
competence of the Community. At a minimum, the Court's discourse on
this subject is the best indication of its present thoughts on this matter. 77
As the Court of Justice is the ultimate interpreter of the Treaty of Rome,
and its decisions are binding on the Member States of the Community, 78
the Court's acceptance of the theory of "parallelism" must be treated most
seriously.
The rule of Community law appears to be:
Each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy
envisaged by the Treaty, lays down common rules, whatever form these may
take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even
collectively, to contract obligations toward non-Member States affecting
these rules. 7
9
76See E. Wall, The Court of Justice of the European Communities 8- 11 (1966) for
comparison of "stare decisis" and the Continental concept of "jurisprudence constante."
77For further consideration of the role of the Court of Justice see STEIN AND HAY, Op.
cit., Ch. 111.
78See, Treaty of Rome.79Commission v. Council, 21.
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